Federal Register: May 7, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 88)]
[Notices]
[Page 23064-23073]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order 13116
(``Super 301'')
AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The United States Trade Representative (USTR) is providing notice that it submitted the report on U.S. trade expansion priorities published herein to the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate and Committee on Ways and Means of the United States House of Representatives pursuant to the provisions (commonly referred to as ``Super 301'') set forth in Executive Order No. 13116 of March 31, 1999.
DATES: The report was submitted on April 30, 2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Demetrios Marantis, Associate General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 600 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20508, 202-395-9626.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the USTR report is as follows.
Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order 13116: April 30, 2001
The Bush Administration has an ambitious trade agenda, reflecting the importance President Bush assigns to trade. This is an opportune moment to reassert America's leadership in setting trade policy and to build a post-Cold War world on the cornerstones of freedom, security, democratic values, open trade, and free markets.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) submits this ``Super 301'' report pursuant to Executive Order 13116 of March 31, 1999. This report sets forth U.S. trade expansion priorities for 2001. The Administration intends to expand trade on multiple fronts, through negotiation of new agreements and by ensuring that existing agreements are fully implemented by U.S. trading partners. At the same time, the Administration intends to ensure that Americans are able to reap the benefits of market-opening agreements by resolving problems that confront U.S. exporters. The USTR prepared this report in close consultation with U.S. Government agencies on the basis of the 2001 Trade Policy Agenda, the 2001 NTE Report, public comments submitted to USTR, and information received from U.S. Embassies abroad.
I. Trade Expansion Priorities for 2001
President Bush spoke at the recent Summit of the Americas in Quebec City about the benefits of trade: ``Free and open trade creates new jobs and new income. It lifts the lives of all our people, applying the power of markets to the needs of the poor. It spurs the process of economic and legal reform. And open trade reinforces the habit of liberty that sustains democracy over the long haul.'' Trade policy is the bridge between the President's international and domestic agendas. As the former governor of a major border state, President Bush has seen that the free exchange of goods and services sparks economic growth, opportunity, dynamism, fresh ideas, and democratic values.
To fulfill the President's vision, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative sets forth the following two trade expansion priorities for 2001: (1) Reestablish a bipartisan consensus on free trade and (2) move on multiple fronts to expand trade.
A. Reestablishing a Bipartisan Consensus on Free Trade
The United States faces key decisions about the future course of our trade policy. Just as the World War II generation forged a bipartisan consensus that sustained successful trade expansion throughout the Cold War, we must build a new consensus to promoteopen markets for trade in the decades to come.
There have been some encouraging developments in the area of open trade in the past year. Congress enhanced the Caribbean Basin Initiative, passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and enacted legislation to grant permanent normal trading relations to China. More recently, the United States and the European Union (EU) have reached an agreement to resolve the long-standing dispute over bananas, and the United States and Chile have pledged to complete negotiations on a free trade agreement by the end of the year. On April 22, President Bush and the leaders of 33 other nations in the Western Hemisphere signed a declaration at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City pledging their support for completing the negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) no later than January 2005. The FTAA will be the world's largest free trade area, representing 800 million people.
There has also been encouraging progress recently on resolving a number of trade disputes through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Greece has moved to counter the piracy of U.S. films and television programs, Mexico has agreed to allow dry beans from the United States to be imported in a more timely and predictable manner, and India has lifted its restrictions on U.S. agricultural, textile, and industrial products.
But there also have been setbacks. When the House of Representatives voted in 1998 to deny the President trade negotiation authority, it marked the first time the Congress had ever rejected granting this authority. And the failure to launch the global trade talks in Seattle in December 1999 handed a high-profile victory to the opponents of free trade, global competition, and economic opportunity.
The history books recount the economic, political, and indeed national dangers of a breakdown in America's trade policy. For the first 150 years of the United States, there were contentious Congressional debates over tariff bills, some even leading to movements for Nullification and Secession. Then the disastrous experience of setting protectionist tariffs for over 20,000 individual items in the Smoot-Hawley bill of 1930 led the Congress four years later to try a different approach: a partnership with the Executive to negotiate lower barriers to trade around the world. Launched by strong and innovative leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, this effort between the Congress and the Executive became a bipartisan partnership, and eventually produced prosperity, opportunity, and liberty beyond the greatest expectations of its supporters.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has put this success in historical perspective by pointing out that the growth in trade as a share of the world economy over the past 50 years has finally managed to reverse the losses from the calamities of the early 20th century, and now approximates the degree of globalization around 1900. So today, just like Americans at the turn of the last century, we face critical decisions about the future course for our country, trade, and the world.
The Benefits of Trade
There are three principal reasons why further trade liberalization is important to the American people. First, expanded trade--imports as well as exports--improves the well being of Americans. It leads to better jobs, with bigger paychecks, in more competitive businesses--as well as to more choices of goods and inputs, with lower prices, for hard-working families and hard-driving entrepreneurs.
Exports accounted for over one-quarter of U.S. economic growth over the last decade and support an estimated 12 million jobs. In the American agricultural sector, one in three acres are planted for export purposes, and last year American farmers sold more than $50 billion worth of agricultural products in foreign markets. Imports helped keep prices down as jobs, compensation, and productivity increased.
Votes for agreements like NAFTA and the Uruguay Round may not have been easy to cast. Yet those agreements contributed to the longest period of economic growth in U.S. history, with levels of full employment, and without inflationary pressures, beyond the forecasts of any economist. Conservative estimates of the higher income and lower prices stemming from the Uruguay Round and NAFTA indicate an annual benefit of between $1,260 and $2,040 for an average American family of four.
The expanding global trade and the expanding economic growth in the United States are not coincidental; they are achieved in concert. One strengthens and reinforces the other. Moreover, restrictions on trade have victims: farmers, school teachers, factory and office workers, small business people, and many others who have to pay more for clothing or food or homes or equipment because of visible and invisible taxes on trade.
Second, as President Bush has stated, free trade is about freedom: ``Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy.'' During the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, President Bush met with Mexico's President Fox, the first president elected from the opposition since the Mexican revolution. It is not an accident that after Mexico embraced the opening of its economic system, as embodied in NAFTA, it was drawn to a democratic opening as well.
Free trade reduces government barriers and encourages vibrant private and civic societies governed by the rule of law. It opens societies to people, to ideas, to debate, to competition, and also to impartial transparent rules. That freedom creates openings for the free press and for NGOs, not just for businesses and entrepreneurs. And it creates openings to the outside world through the Internet, books, and a whole series of new networks.
Third, expanded trade affects our nation's security. The crises of the first 45 years of the last century--the economic retrogression referred to by Chairman Greenspan--were inextricably linked with hostile protectionism and national socialism. Communism could not compete with democratic capitalism, because economic and political freedom creates energy, competition, opportunity, and independent thinking.
Take an example from today. Colombia is waging a battle to defend the rule of law against those who finance their terror through complicity in drug trafficking. President Pastrana has said that one way to counter this threat would be for Congress to renew the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), which expires in December. Renewal, he says, would stimulate job creation, strengthen the democratically elected government, and diminish the appeal of the drug trade. With a renewed and robust ATPA, the United States and Colombia can broaden our efforts on behalf of freedom--from aid to trade.
Building Public Support for Trade
These benefits of open trade can only be achieved if we build public support for trade at home. To do so, the Administration must enforce, vigorously and with dispatch, our trade laws against unfair practices. In the world of global economics, justice delayed can become justice lost.
For the United States to maintain an effective trade policy and an open international trading system, Americans must have confidence that trade is fair and works for their benefit. That means ensuring that other countries live up to their obligations under the trade agreements they sign.
Change, particularly rapid adjustments, can be very difficult--even frightening--for many hard-working people. We need to help people adapt and benefit from change--whether prompted by trade, technology, e-commerce, new business models, or other causes. Therefore, a successful trade policy over the long term should be accompanied by better schools, worker adjustment assistance, tax policies that enable people to keep and save more of their paychecks, and reforms of Social Security and Medicare so older Americans have a safer retirement.
In order to build continued support for free trade, the United States, and all nations, will need to be more adroit in aligning trade with our values. That means responding to concerns that trade undermines environmental protection and labor standards--while not permitting these issues to be used for protectionist ends. By tackling these issues today, we can help shape the thinking about how to address them.
Getting Back in the Trading Game
To strengthen and speed America's trade and economic policy, we will need to reestablish the bipartisan Congressional-Executive negotiating partnership that has delivered so much. In President Bush's address at the Summit of the Americas, he made clear that achieving U.S. Trade Promotion Authority was one of his top priorities. This authority, as he has pointed out, has been granted to each of the previous five presidents. The Bush Administration is committed to attaining U.S. Trade Promotion Authority before the end of the year, and will be working with the Congress to build the broadest possible support.
In the absence of this authority, other countries have been moving forward with trade agreements while America has stalled. We are in danger of being left behind. There was a time when U.S. involvement in international trade negotiations was a prerequisite for them to succeed. That is no longer true. Other countries are writing the rules of the international trading system as they negotiate without us.
The EU has free trade or customs agreements with 27 countries, and 20 of these agreements have been signed since 1990. The EU is in the process of negotiating 15 more. Last year, the European Union and Mexico--the second-largest market for American exports--entered into a free trade agreement. The EU is also negotiating free-trade agreements with the Mercosur nations and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Japan is negotiating a free trade agreement with Singapore, and is exploring free trade agreements with Mexico, Korea, and Chile. There are approximately 130 free trade agreements in force globally, but the United States has only two agreements in force: one is with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), and the other with Israel.
In the long run, our deadlock hurts American businesses, workers, and farmers. They will find themselves shut out of the many preferential trade and investment agreements negotiated by our trading partners. To cite one example, while U.S. exports to Chile face an eight percent tariff, the Canada-Chile trade agreement will free Canadian imports of this duty. As a result, U.S. wheat farmers are losing markets in Chile to Canadian exports. To correct the disparity in tariffs, USTR is pursuing negotiations with Chile on a free trade agreement.
We cannot afford to stand still--or be mired in partisan division--while other nations seize the mantle of leadership on trade from the United States. This would be a huge missed opportunity, indeed an historic mistake.
B. Moving on Multiple Fronts To Expand Trade
In the 21st century, the economic and political future of the United States will be increasingly linked to those of our hemispheric neighbors. U.S. trade and investment with the hemisphere is projected to exceed that with Europe by the end of this decade. U.S. shipments to Latin America have increased by 137% in the past decade, compared to a 96% increase for exports to the rest of the world.
As Latin America grows, the United States benefits. In recent years, every one percent expansion in Latin America's GDP was associated with an additional $1.6 billion worth of U.S. exports to the region. In the months and years ahead, the Bush Administration will be negotiating the FTAA. A free trade area linking the Americas will provide incentives and rewards for governments pursuing difficult economic reforms. A hemispheric free trade agreement would also send a valuable signal--a signal of confidence--to potential investors that Latin American and Caribbean nations have agreed to abide by common rules governing trade, to create a truly hemispheric marketplace, and that this mutual effort offers not just stability, but opportunity. Even as we negotiate the FTAA, we are open to pursuing other complementary opportunities to foster free trade with our neighbors, for example, through bilateral free trade negotiations, such as the current negotiations with Chile.
Of course, America's trade and economic interests extend far beyond this hemisphere. At the core of the WTO's agenda this year will be negotiations mandated by the Uruguay Round agreements to pursue further agricultural reform and liberalization in services. We also want to launch a new round of global trade negotiations in the WTO, emphasizing a key role for agriculture. We will also seek to negotiate regional and bilateral agreements to open markets around the world. There are opportunities in the Asia Pacific and with APEC. We will start with a free trade agreement with Singapore and will work with the Congress to pass the basic trade agreement with Vietnam negotiated by the Clinton Administration. We will urge Japan to deregulate, restructure and open its economy, which is long overdue.
Further reforms in the Middle East and Africa need our encouragement. We are committed to working with the Congress to enact legislation for a free trade agreement with Jordan, and to implement the provisions of laws to help Africa and the Caribbean. Providing technical assistance to African and Caribbean countries will be a key part of the implementation process.
As India reforms its economy and taps its great potential, we should explore ways to achieve mutual benefits. To help developing nations appreciate that globalization and open markets can assist their own efforts to reform and grow, we will need to extend the legislation authorizing the Generalized System of Preferences program.
Of vital importance, we will seek to work closely with the EU and its candidate members in Central and Eastern Europe, both to fulfill the promise of a trans-Atlantic marketplace already being created by business investment and trade, as well as to reinvigorate, improve, and strengthen the WTO processes. The total amount of two-way investment in the EU and the United States amounts to over $1.1 trillion, with each partner employing about 3 million people in the other. We would be remiss to neglect our common interests while working to resolve more immediate disputes.
Now that there is a fragile peace in the Balkans, we must secure it by pointing people toward economic hope and regional integration. Therefore, we would like to work with the Congress to follow through on the prior administration's proposal to offer trade preferences to countries in Southeast Europe.
As we move on multiple fronts to expand trade, we will continue to emphasize WTO accessions. The accession process is an opportunity for reforming economies to adopt trade liberalizing policies and practices within the framework of WTO obligations. It also provides a context for the United States to expand market access opportunities for its exports of goods and services and to address outstanding trade issues. WTO accessions are based on full implementation of WTO obligations and the establishment of commercially meaningful market access for other Members' exports. This strengthens the international trading system.
These principles have formed the basis for the completion of WTO accession negotiations with a number of countries, including Albania, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Jordan, and Oman. In other ongoing negotiations with countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia, U.S. participation in the accession process will enhance the rule of law in trade and enhanced market access, while demonstrating support for the reform agendas of these countries.
The Administration will also continue efforts to complete China's accession to the WTO. Completing this process will provide substantially greater market access for industrial goods, services, and agricultural products. It will require China to comply with specific rules on import surges, anti-dumping and subsidies practices, while eliminating many of the conditions China requires for the approval of imports and investment. We will also work to ensure that Taiwan's accession to the WTO is approved at the same session of the WTO General Council.
The Opportunity Ahead
The United States has an unparalleled opportunity to shape the international trading order. But we have to get back into this game and take the lead. We are certainly in a position to do so. The United States is prepared to pursue a number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the years ahead, as well as the global trade negotiations in the WTO. By moving on multiple fronts, we hope we can create a competition in trade liberalization. The message we are sending to other countries is that the United States is willing to negotiate. We are willing to open if they open. But if some countries are slow, we will move without them.
II. Monitoring Trade Agreements and Resolving Disputes
The Bush Administration will continue to work with Congress and American businesses, farmers, workers and consumers to ensure effective monitoring of U.S. trade agreements and quick responses to non-compliance--including through the use of WTO and other dispute settlement procedures, WTO oversight committees, and U.S. trade laws. At the same time, the Administration will seek to prevent or reduce problems facing U.S. exporters by working with U.S. trading partners, including through technical assistance where appropriate, so that consultation and training will help head off problems before they arise. Likewise, together with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and State, and other agencies, USTR will continue to work bilaterally with our trading partners to resolve disputes quickly and expeditiously before these issues become serious problems.
To ensure the enforcement of WTO agreements, the United States has been one of the world's most frequent users of WTO dispute settlement procedures. In enforcing the WTO agreements, the United States has focused in particular on foreign practices that could pose serious problems to the international trading system if they proliferated in many markets. Therefore, USTR aims not only at challenging existing barriers but also at preventing the future adoption of similar barriers around the world.
A. Ensuring Compliance
Efforts to promote compliance with trade agreements have used three principal tools: (1) the WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms; (2) the various WTO oversight bodies; and (3) enforcement of U.S. trade law. Vigorous enforcement enhances the ability of the United States to reap the benefits of trade agreements that USTR negotiates, ensures that we can continue to open markets, and builds confidence in the trading system.
1. WTO and NAFTA Dispute Settlement Results
WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement procedures have enabled the United States to resolve problems arising from the failure of trading partners to implement their international obligations, and to resolve disputes over interpretation of various provisions in the WTO or NAFTA agreements. Our hope in filing cases is, of course, to secure U.S. benefits rather than to engage in prolonged litigation. Therefore, whenever possible we have sought to reach favorable settlements that address U.S. concerns without having to resort to panel proceedings. We have been able to achieve this preferred result in 14 of the 32 cases concluded so far, and have prevailed through litigation in 15 cases. During the past year, we have achieved the following results:
2. WTO Oversight Bodies
Through WTO oversight bodies, the United States works to
secure
implementation of WTO commitments. These oversight bodies monitor
implementation of the various WTO agreements, review WTO Members'
laws and regulations, identify potential problems, and offer
technical assistance or other expertise when necessary to help
ensure compliance and implementation of commitments. The United
States actively asserts its rights and pursues its interests through
these mechanisms.
3. U.S. Trade Laws
U.S. trade laws are an important means of ensuring
enforcement
of U.S. rights and interests in trade. In the past year, use of
Section 301, Section 1377, Super 301, Special 301, and Title VII has
enabled the United States to challenge market access barriers to
U.S. goods and services, protect U.S. intellectual property rights,
ensure compliance with telecommunications agreements, and address
discriminatory foreign government procurement practices. Through its
trade preference programs, the United States also seeks to ensure
that beneficiary countries meet the statutory conditions, which can
include providing internationally recognized worker rights and
adequate intellectual property protection.
While promoting free trade abroad, we vigorously enforce our
trade laws in order to give Americans the confidence needed to keep
markets open. The Administration is committed to aggressively
enforcing U.S. trade laws to address the adverse impact that
unfairly traded steel imports have on U.S. steel companies and U.S.
jobs. There are currently more than 150 anti-dumping and
countervailing duty actions in effect or under investigation
relating to steel products. In addition, the steel industry is
currently receiving import relief under Section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974 for line pipe and steel wire rod products. In addition to
actively enforcing U.S. trade laws, the Administration will engage
key steel producing countries to address bilaterally and
multilaterally the underlying structural distortions that foster
unfair trade in steel. Despite the trade remedies that are currently
in place, the Administration is very concerned about the health of
the steel industry. The Administration is monitoring closely the
global steel market and steel trade practices and will take
additional actions as needed.
B. Status of WTO Disputes
In the April 2000 Super 301 Report, USTR announced its
intention
to resort to WTO dispute settlement procedures as a means of
resolving concerns in seven instances. This section reports on the
status of those disputes.
C. New Requests for Consultations
In addition to the disputes discussed above, the United
States
has invoked WTO dispute settlement procedures in three other
disputes since last year's Super 301 report:
III. Realizing the Benefits of Trade
The Bush Administration is carefully monitoring practices a
number of foreign practices, using all the available tools to
address the concerns of U.S. exporters. These include measures that
occur in many markets and across many sectors. The barriers
discussed below are just some examples of the practices that the
Administration is carefully monitoring.
A. Import Policies
Restrictive or burdensome import policies can undermine the
ability of U.S. exporters to realize the full benefits of market
access commitments. Such policies occur in many forms. Provided
below are examples of three types of import policies that currently
represent serious barriers to U.S. exports.
Reference Prices: The WTO Customs Valuation Agreement
stipulates
that the transaction price is the primary basis for customs
valuation determinations. However, certain countries appear to rely
on ``reference prices,'' which can artificially inflate the customs
value of imported goods. The United States has actively pursued the
issue of reference prices in the WTO Committee on Customs Valuation
and has engaged in WTO dispute settlement consultations with Romania
and Brazil regarding such practices. As discussed above, WTO
consultations with Romania appear to have addressed many concerns,
and the United States remains in WTO consultations with Brazil in an
effort to resolve similar issues. India continues to maintain a
minimum import price system for imports of primary and secondary
steel products. In early 2000, the Government of India removed
primary steel products from the regime. This action was challenged
in the Indian courts, which reapplied the regime to primary steel
products. The United States is considering appropriate steps to
take, which could include WTO dispute settlement action.
The continued existence of such practices in Mexico remains
of
serious concern. On October 1, 2000, Mexico significantly increased
the costs associated with its reference price system by imposing a
burdensome new cash deposit guarantee requirement for subject goods.
Cash deposits based on reference prices are not returned for at
least six months, and Mexican banks charge high fees to open and
maintain customs accounts. Bilateral discussions with Mexico are
planned for mid-2001. Based on these consultations, the United
States will consider what additional steps are necessary, including
WTO dispute settlement action.
Dealer Protection Laws: Several Central American and
Carribean
countries (e.g., Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Dominican Republic and Haiti) have in place laws, regulations and
other measures which appear to have the objective of preventing
foreign exporters from terminating importation and distribution
contracts with local companies except under very stringent
conditions often requiring payments of large indemnities to the
local company. To the extent that they apply only to imports, such
laws may be inconsistent with GATT national treatment requirements.
Application of these laws can have harmful effects on the economy as
a whole and on consumers. U.S. exporters report that distributors'
profit margins are extremely high in these countries and that
distributors often refuse to service certain segments of the local
market. Faced with such conditions, exporters are often prevented
from bringing their products to the market most effectively, and
consumers face high costs and limited choice of products. We will
address this issue in a variety of contexts, notably in bilateral
discussions with our trading partners.
Motor Vehicle Policies: Certain of our trading partners
maintain
restrictive motor vehicle policies which limit market access for
U.S. exporters. For instance, lack of foreign access to the motor
vehicle market of Korea remains of significant concern. The United
States and Korea concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in
October 1998 according to which Korea agreed to undertake a number
of specific actions. Although Korea has taken steps to implement
specific provisions of the MOU, foreign access remains severely
restricted, as evidenced by the tiny foreign share of the Korean
auto market, which totaled 0.3 percent in 2000. Korea's high tariffs
and cascading tax structure on motor vehicles continue to impair the
competitiveness of imported motor vehicles. Moreover, Korean
consumers continue to believe they will face public opprobrium for
purchasing a foreign car, the legacy of years of government-
sponsored anti-import campaigns. Although Korea recently acceded to
the 1998 Global Agreement for the harmonization of world automotive
standards, it continues to develop overly-burdensome standards that
impede imports and are contrary to the spirit of global
harmonization and the 1998 MOU. The United States will continue to
push Korea to fulfill the objectives of the 1998 MOU and to develop
a package of meaningful measures that will result in substantial
increases in market access for foreign motor vehicles.
U.S. exporters are experiencing related problems in Japan.
The
1995 U.S.-Japan Automotive Agreement, which sought to eliminate
market access barriers and significantly expand sales opportunities
in this sector, expired on December 31, 2000. Although some progress
was made under the 1995 agreement, the overall objectives of the
1995 agreement were not met. There are a number of factors
contributing to the disappointing results, one of which has been the
weakness of the domestic Japanese economy over the past three years.
However, the effects of the Japanese recession have been
disproportionately felt by foreign firms. In addition, the pace of
deregulation has slowed significantly. Lack of transparency in both
procurement and rule-making persists, and keiretsu ties continue to
impede full and fair competition in this market. Further, while
investment opportunities in the vehicle market have increased
notably, opportunities for automotive parts makers remain largely
unchanged. This situation, coupled with recent trends in bilateral
automotive trade, has underscored the need for further market-
opening efforts by Japan. The United States hopes to work closely
and cooperatively with Japan on this issue in the coming months.
B. Technical Regulations and Rule-Making
WTO Members have developed disciplines--primarily through the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)--to ensure that
standards, testing, conformity assessment procedures, and related
measures are developed and applied in a transparent and non-
discriminatory manner. These disciplines have served to prevent
trading partners from using such technical requirements for
protectionist purposes. Nevertheless, U.S. exporters continue to
face adverse conditions in several important markets. Although there
are many other such barriers around the world, we highlight the
following two examples:
Technical Regulations: Such regulations can impose onerous
conditions on U.S. exports. For instance, in Mexico, certain
regulations require the inspection and approval of manufacturing
facilities in order to obtain a sanitary license to sell certain
herbal and nutritional products in Mexico. However, Mexican
authorities refuse to inspect U.S.-based manufacturing facilities.
Denying U.S. exporters the ability to have their facilities
inspected and approved on the same basis as their Mexican
counterparts raises serious concerns about Mexico's adherence to its
trade agreement obligations. The United States has raised these
concerns with Mexico. Mexican authorities have advised us that they
are looking at ways to address our concerns consistent with NAFTA
and WTO obligations; however, to date, we have seen no progress. If
this problem is not resolved in a timely manner that will allow U.S.
companies without Mexican-based production facilities to resume
exporting their products to Mexico, the United States will consider
whether to request consultations under the NAFTA or the WTO to
resolve this issue.
Transparency in Rule-Making: An important aspect in the
development of technical regulations is transparency in the
regulatory process. Assuring transparency and effective
participation in the rule-making process can be extremely useful in
preventing trade problems associated with such measures. A growing
number of U.S. trade concerns stem from the lack of transparency in
the development of the technical regulations of the EU. EU
procedures for the development of EU technical regulations appear to
undermine multilateral provisions intended to provide an opportunity
for meaningful comment on draft regulations, because the EU notification to the WTO is only
made after the European Commission has finalized its proposal (and
forwarded it to other EU institutions for consideration/approval).
As a result, the United States and other interested parties are
unlikely to have a meaningful opportunity to have any input or
concerns addressed or reflected in a directive's provisions.
Furthermore, while European regional standards can be used to meet
an EU directive's ``essential'' requirements, EU procedures do not
provide a meaningful opportunity to provide comments on the
relationship of these standards to the EU directive's requirements.
The lack of transparency in EU rulemaking raises serious questions
about EU compliance with obligations under the WTO TBT Agreement.
The United States will closely monitor developments and will
consider all options to ensure that these obligations are fully met.
C. Agricultural Practices and SPS Measures
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture and on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures have been instrumental to the ability
of the U.S. agricultural sector to take advantage of its
competitiveness and export its products abroad. The United States
continues to be vigilant in its effort to prevent our trading
partners from maintaining trade-distorting practices that
disadvantage U.S. agricultural exports. For example, as discussed
above, in response to a petition filed, the USTR is currently
investigating practices of Canada and the Canadian Wheat Board under
Section 301 of U.S. trade laws. We also are examining information
gathered from U.S. agricultural exporters to assist us in our
negotiations on agriculture in the WTO, the FTAA and bilateral
negotiations, including public comments received in preparation for
this year's Super 301 report.
In addition, the United States has serious concerns that
Japan,
in an unprecedented manner, is taking actions affecting access to
its markets for agricultural products. In early April 2001, Japan
implemented a new quarantine inspection system for fresh vegetables,
strawberries and melons, which limited the number of daily
inspections at Japan's air and seaports. Japan took this action
without prior consultation with trading partners or adequate
explanation of a scientific rationale for the new system. Japan is
also considering taking, for the first time, import safeguard
actions on a wide range of agricultural and other products. It has
announced that it will implement safeguard measures on three
agricultural products--fresh shiitake mushrooms, stone leeks (i.e.,
welsh onions) and tatami mat reeds--beginning April 23, 2001. Among
the other products Japan is investigating are lumber, onions, and
tomatoes, which are of commercial interest to the United States.
U.S. exports (CY 2000) of these products totaled over $240 million.
The U.S. Government, at senior levels, has raised with the Japanese
Government its serious concerns about these measures affecting
imports. The United States will closely monitor Japan's import
measures to ensure they comply with WTO obligations.
The United States also has serious concerns regarding the
process of import risk assessment for SPS measures in Australia. SPS
measures protect against risks associated with plant or animal borne
pests and diseases, additives, contaminants, toxins, and disease-
causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs. The WTO SPS
Agreement establishes rules and procedures to ensure that SPS
measures address legitimate human, animal, and plant health
concerns, do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
Members' agricultural or food products, and are not disguised
restrictions on international trade. Transparency is an integral
aspect of the development of SPS measures and is often extremely
useful in preventing trade problems associated with SPS measures.
Although Australia revised and published its import risk assessment
procedures in 2000, the process in Australia remains non-transparent
and fraught with delays. Australia's continued ban on the
importation of California table grapes illustrates problems
encountered, and other countries have comparable complaints. The
United States has been seeking entry into Australia's market, in
some cases for more than a decade, for Florida citrus, pork,
poultry, stone fruit, and apples in addition to California table
grapes.
D. Government Procurement
The 2001 ``Title VII'' report, which USTR releases
simultaneously with the Super 301 report on April 30 (available on
the USTR web site (www.ustr.gov)),
addresses a number of
discriminatory government procurement practices, including
implementation of the EU ``Utilities Directive'' by government
telecommunications utilities, various discriminatory practices in
the public works sector of Japan, discriminatory practices and
procedural barriers to trade in Taiwan, discrimination in Canada
against U.S. suppliers in provincial government procurement
procedures, and the potential discriminatory effects of ``sect
filters'' in Germany. The ``Title VII'' report provides background
on these issues and the steps the Administration is taking to
address them.
E. Subsidy Practices
Unfair government subsidies distort the free flow of goods
and
adversely affect U.S. business in the global marketplace. Rules
covering industrial subsidies have evolved and are intended to
prohibit or discourage the most distortive kinds of subsidies, and
to allow governments to use less distortive subsidies in order to
achieve the broader social or economic objectives of interest to
them under certain circumstances. Provided below are representative
examples of subsidy practices that the Administration is monitoring
closely.
The United States continues to be concerned about the
prospect
of further subsidization of the Airbus consortium by Member State
governments of the EU. Since the inception of Airbus in 1967, Airbus
member governments have provided massive subsidies to their
respective member companies to aid in the development, production
and marketing of the Airbus family of large civil aircraft. Airbus
partner governments have borne 75 to 100 percent of the development
costs for all major lines of Airbus aircraft and provided other
forms of support, including equity infusions, debt forgiveness, debt
rollovers and marketing assistance. Some loans for Airbus programs,
repayable from royalties on aircraft sold, have been effectively
forgiven because projected sales did not materialize. The EU also
supports Airbus indirectly through government funded research
targeted at specific civil aircraft projects. Government support of
Airbus raises serious concerns about EU Member State compliance with
their bilateral and multilateral obligations in this sector. The
United States has urged the Airbus member governments to ensure that
their planned support for the Airbus A380 aircraft program is on
commercial terms, reflecting the fact that Airbus is now a highly
competitive global producer of aircraft. The European Commission
recently informed the United States that seven EU Member State
governments have committed to substantial direct support to develop
the A380 aircraft. The United States is examining the information
that the European Commission provided and plans to seek further
information in future discussions with the EU.
In addition, the Government of Korea, through the Korean
Development Bank (KDB), has initiated a program aimed at providing
direct financial support to several large companies that are
encountering severe cash flow problems. For example, the KDB
purchased $200 million worth of newly issued Hyundai Electronics
Industries (HEI) bonds in January 2001. The KDB made similar
purchases of the newly issued bonds of five other cash-strapped,
debt-burdened Korean companies, three of which are other Hyundai
subsidiaries. The KDB reportedly plans to provide additional
financing in the future to HEI and other companies to cover $15-20
billion in bonds coming due in 2001. The Korean Government maintains
that only viable companies will benefit from temporary KDB support
and that the KDB support will terminate at the end of 2001. The
United States has expressed its concern to Korea about the negative
implications of this type of government-directed lending for Korea's
restructuring efforts and the Korean economy. The United States also
has noted that a significant share of the benefits under this
program has been provided thus far to companies that are largely
export focused and has raised with Korea its concerns over the
potential inconsistency of this intervention with the WTO Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
F. Services and Investment Barriers
Services are what most Americans do for a living. Service
industries account for nearly 80 percent of both U.S. employment and
GDP. U.S. cross-border exports of commercial services (i.e.,
excluding military and government) were $255 billion in 1999,
supporting over 4 million services and manufacturing jobs in the
United States. U.S. services exports have more than doubled over the
last 10 years, increasing from $118 billion in 1989 to $255 billion
last year.
Likewise, foreign investment provides capital that fuels economic
expansion, increases productivity, improves living standards, and
provides links to the international marketplace. Access to overseas
investment markets allows U.S. companies to remain competitive in a
world of new and changing opportunities. U.S.-owned companies with
affiliates abroad accounted for 64% of total U.S. goods exports in
1998.
These statistics reveal the importance of services and
investment in promoting open markets. Continued liberalization in
this area represents a ``force multiplier'' for structural reforms
abroad and for economic growth domestically.
Unfortunately, as discussed below, we continue to encounter
barriers to the supply of U.S. services and to investment by U.S.
businesses, particularly with respect to telecommunications
regulations, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) in the
automobile sector, and retail store laws. We therefore make it a
priority to intensify our efforts to promote the dynamism of this
sector and reduce trade barriers.
Telecommunications Trade Barriers: Since the WTO Basic
Telecommunications Agreement came into force in February 1998,
telecommunications markets overseas have rapidly opened to
competition. U.S. companies have invested billions of dollars to
build global networks, partner with foreign companies, and expand
their commercial presence in foreign markets. However, as discussed
in USTR's review of telecommunications trade agreements under
``Section 1377'', released on April 2, 2001 (see www.ustr.gov),
practices of certain trading partners raise serious concern about
compliance with their international telecommunications obligations.
For instance, in Taiwan, telecommunications regulations
impose
serious limitations on the competitive offering of
telecommunications services and undermine the ability of new
entrants to compete in Taiwan's market. These restrictions also
appear to be inconsistent with the commitments undertaken by Taiwan
as part of its bilateral WTO accession negotiations with the United
States to liberalize its telecommunications market by July 1, 2001.
USTR welcomes the ongoing regulatory review of Taiwan's telecom
regulations and expects this review to result in the promised
liberalization of its market. If Taiwan does not appear to be taking
the necessary steps to liberalize its market consistent with its
commitments, USTR will consider appropriate action, including under
Section 1374 of the 1988 Trade Act. In addition, as discussed above,
the United States remains seriously concerned that Mexico has not
yet addressed the key issue of ensuring competition in the market
for international calls or enforcing certain rules designed to
address anti-competitive conduct in telecommunications services.
Absent progress on these issues by June 1, the United States will
determine whether additional action is necessary, including moving
the pending WTO case forward.
Auto TRIMS: The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) limits the ability of foreign governments to
develop programs that favor the purchase or use of goods produced
locally. Such measures often reduce the export of U.S.-manufactured
goods and also impede a company that operates in a market with TRIMs
from acting in an economically efficient manner. The maintenance of
TRIMs has been a particular problem in the motor vehicle sector. As
discussed above, the United States currently has two pending WTO
cases on this issue, challenging the maintenance by India and the
Philippines of measures affecting trade and investment in the motor
vehicle sector.
The United States also has serious concerns about local
content
requirements imposed by Malaysia on the production of motor
vehicles. Under the TRIMs Agreement, Malaysia was required to remove
these measures by January 1, 2000 unless additional time was granted
by the WTO. On December 29, 1999, Malaysia made a formal request for
an additional two years to bring these measures into compliance with
its obligations under the Agreement. The United States has noted its
willingness to agree to an extension, but is concerned by
conflicting statements made by the Government of Malaysia with
regard to its intentions. For this reason, the United States will
continue to monitor Malaysia's compliance with its WTO obligations
in the motor vehicle sector.
Retail Store Laws: Retail store laws that discriminate with
regard to the country of origin of the goods that a retailer can
sell harm not only the firms operating in this sector, but also harm
consumers by limiting access to products that may be more
competitive in terms of price and quality. The Philippines requires
that certain foreign retailers source at least 30 percent of their
inventory, by value, in the Philippines. Additionally, firms
specializing in luxury goods must source at least 10 percent of
their inventory, by value, in the Philippines. These requirements
appear to violate the Philippines' commitments under several WTO
agreements. The United States will monitor this issue to determine
what action should be taken to address these concerns.
G. Lack of Intellectual Property Protection
The USTR is releasing the ``Special 301'' report today (see
www.ustr.gov),
which identifies those countries that deny adequate
and effective intellectual property protection or that deny fair and
equitable market access to U.S. intellectual property products. As
discussed above, on March 13, 2001, the United States self-initiated
a section 301 investigation following the identification of Ukraine
as a Priority Foreign Country under Special 301 for Ukraine's
persistent failure to take effective action against significant
levels of optical media piracy and to implement adequate and
effective intellectual property laws. In addition, this year's
Special 301 report addresses a number of key issues, including (1)
failure of numerous economies, including Brazil and Taiwan, to take
effective enforcement action that provides adequate deterrence
against commercial piracy and counterfeiting; (2) failure of the
European Union to provide national treatment for the protection of
geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs;
(3) failure by Argentina, Hungary and Israel, among others, to
provide adequate protection for the confidential test data of
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical companies; (4) the
insufficient term of protection for patents in trading partners such
as the Dominican Republic and India; (5) the inadequate protection
for pre-existing works in numerous trading partners, particularly in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan; (6) the failure of the Philippines to provide
adequate enforcement, including making available ex parte search
remedies; and (7) lax border enforcement against pirate and
counterfeit goods in many of our trading partners.
H. Barriers to Trade in Electronic Commerce
Barriers to electronic commerce can occur at various points
in
the e-commerce value chain, such as restrictions on basic
telecommunications services, Internet access services, and services
provided through the Internet. For example, Israel is pursuing a
policy that would disadvantage U.S. companies wishing to offer
Internet access services over the cable platform and would favor the
state-owned telecommunications company (Bezeq). Although Israel has
licensed Bezeq to enter the high-speed Internet access market
without any licensing fees, it has introduced legislation that will
require cable television companies seeking to enter this market to
pay licensing fees (above their cable franchise fees). The United
States is seriously concerned that regulatory favoritism undermines
the investment environment in Internet services in Israel. We will
closely monitor developments in Israel as well as in other markets.
I. Other Barriers
Not all trade obstacles fit neatly into one category. There
are
many exporters facing conditions in overlapping categories that
combine to limit market access to U.S. goods and services, and
unfavorable treatment of a certain foreign industry by any given
country often involves a multitude of overlapping barriers. One
illustration of how numerous trade measures can affect the
conditions for access to overseas markets can be found in the
textile and apparel industries. U.S. industry has raised a series of
concerns regarding a number of measures, often used in combination,
that impede access to overseas markets, including: high tariffs,
additional import taxes and charges, some of which may be forgiven
for goods destined for the export market, excessive and impractical
marking and labeling requirements, reference pricing and non-
automatic licensing, burdensome certificates of origin requirements,
lack of intellectual property protection, and pre-shipment
inspection requirements. Ironically, some of the countries with the
most protected internal markets are also the most significant
beneficiaries of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing's
liberalization and elimination provisions, as applied by the United
States. The United States will continue its efforts to work within
the WTO and with our trading partners to ensure that all countries
meet their WTO obligations to
open their market to textile and apparel products.
The United States has continuing concerns about treatment of
foreign, research-based pharmaceuticals under the reimbursement
pricing systems in place in Korea and Taiwan. These reimbursement
pricing systems lack transparency and appear arbitrary, raising
questions about whether they are being implemented in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner. These systems also create an uncertain
business environment for pharmaceutical manufacturers. In addition,
burdensome and non-science-based regulatory requirements are applied
to pharmaceutical products in Korea and Taiwan, including
requirements relating to the acceptance of foreign clinical test
data, testing, and approval of new drugs. Korea and Taiwan need to
undertake significant improvements in their systems to make them
fair, non-discriminatory and transparent. Finally, while the Korean
Government has been responsive to some U.S. concerns in the
pharmaceutical sector, serious questions remain regarding the lack
of IPR protection for these products. In particular, the lack of
coordination between the Korea Food and Drug Administration and the
Korea Intellectual Property Office concerning marketing approval for
pharmaceuticals and inadequate data protection, discourage the
introduction of innovative drugs. The U.S. Government will continue
to pursue these issues with the Korean Government to ensure that
foreign pharmaceuticals are provided fair and non-discriminatory
treatment in the Korean market.
Finally, the U.S. flat glass industry continues to experience
serious market access problems in Japan, owing mainly to the
continued domination of the Japanese flat glass market by domestic
flat glass manufacturers. Over the past year, U.S. industry has
strengthened its business and marketing activities in Japan.
However, despite better quality, technology and competitive prices,
U.S. flat glass manufacturers have failed to gain access to the
Japanese market commensurate with their level of access in the rest
of the world. The domination by Japanese flat glass manufacturers of
distributors is a key problem for U.S. firms. The leading Japanese
flat glass producers exert tight control over flat glass
distribution by majority ownership, equity and financing ties,
employee exchanges, and purchasing quotas. The U.S. Government
remains very concerned about the closed distribution channels in the
oligopolistic flat glass sector. To address these concerns, the U.S.
Government has proposed, under the bilateral Enhanced Initiative on
Deregulation and Competition Policy, that the Japanese Government
take further steps to promote competition in wholesale and retail
distribution channels for a range of products, including flat glass.
The U.S. Government will continue to monitor closely the flat glass
industry and urges the Japanese Government to promote competition
and eliminate unhealthy oligopolistic behavior in the flat glass
sector.
A. Jane Bradley,
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Monitoring and Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 01-11355 Filed 5-4-01; 8:45 am]
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